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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
JONATHON SOPER, : Case No, 14501 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a denial of Appellantfs motion to set 
aside a negotiated plea for reasons that promises to him, the basis 
for which he entered his plea, had not been fulfilled. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant-appellant plead guilty to a third degree felony 
based upon promises made to him by the prosecutor. When promises 
made to defendant-appellant were not carried out he moved the court 
to set aside his guilty plea. The motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant appeals from the denial of his motion to set 
aside his guilty plea and ask the court to order his guilty plea and 
judgment of conviction set aside. 
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i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS * 
The appellant was charged with the crime of Aggravated Assault 
arising out of an incident which occurred in Salt Lake City on 
October 21, 1974 (R.6,7). Prior to March 4, 1975 negotiations were 
entered into between the appellant and the prosecuting attorneys of 
Salt Lake and Box Elder Counties resulting in an agreement that in 
return for a guilty plea by the appellant to the charge in Salt Lake 
County the charges in Box Elder County would be dismissed (R.57,58). 
On March 4, 1975 the appellant plead guilty as charged in Salt Lake 
County (R.57,58) the plea negotiations were read into the record and 
the defendant was promised by the Court that his plea bargain would be 
fulfilled (R.57,58). The appellant was committed to the Division 
of Corrections for a 90 day evaluation (R.58) and later committed 
to the prison for the indeterminate term as provided for by law 
(R.16). In the meantime the appellant appeared in Brigham City on 
April 22, 1975 (R.58) with a different defense counsel than he had in 
Salt Lake County (R. 59). A new Deputy County Attorney in Box Elder 
County who was unaware of the prior plea bargain handled the matter 
(R.59). The Box Elder County attorney does not remember that the 
appellant mentioned the plea bargain (R.59). The plea bargain was not 
kept and the appellant was forced to plead guilty to a gun charge in 
Box Elder County (R. 59,100). 
On December 5, 1975 the appellant moved the Third District Court 
to set aside his plea (R.60). On February 5, 1976 the court 
denied said motion (R.62) for the reasons that the appellant had not 
complained of his unkept plea bargain at the earliest occasion (R.60, 
" -^ — i-i—*. *.u~~ *A*\*SA o-n offiHavif st-flflnff that he had 
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objected to his plea bargain not being honored in the Brigham City 
Courts at the very time it was not honored (R. 100) . Based on the 
affidavit the appellant moved the court for rehearing (R.102). The 
motion was denied (R.101). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE, AS A RESULT OF A PLEA BARGAIN, THE APPELLANT PLEAD 
GUILTY TO ONE CHARGE IN RETURN FOR A PROMISE TO DISMISS 
ANOTHER CHARGE AGAINST HIM AND THE OTHER CHARGE WAS NOT 
DISMISSED THE APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA MUST BE SET ASIDE 
AND THE CASE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
At the time the Appellant entered his plea in Third District 
Court the court promised him that an additional charge pending against 
him in Brigham City would be dismissed (R.58). 
At the hearing on Appellant's motion to vacate his guilty plea 
the trial court conceeded that the appellant was induced to plead 
guilty by the promise of dismissal of the charges against him in 
Box Elder County (T. 1, 2) and further that the promise was in fact 
not kept (T.2) and that such failure constituted a "break of the 
bargain11 (T. 9). 
As a result of the failure of the prosecutor in Box Elder 
County to fulfill his commitment, defendant is entitled to relief 
under the authority of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 30 L. Ed. 
427, (1971), and United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1974). 
In both cited cases, convictions were reversed because of the failure 
of the prosecutors to adhere to their promises as to what they would 
recommend at the time of sentencing. In the case at bar the failure 
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of bargain is much more severe. It also is a failure to keep a promise 
of the Court. Instead of having the additional charge against him 
dismissed as promised by the court the appellant was forced to negotiate 
anew and plead guilty to a second charge. The case at bar is similar 
to both Santobello and Brown supra in that the breach might have 
been due to a change in prosecutors and hence unintentional on the 
part of the prosecutor. However, the Supreme Court stated in 
Santobello supra 404 U.S. at 262 "The staff Lawyers in the prosecutor's 
office have the burden of 'letting the left hand know what the right 
hand is doing1 or has done. That the breach of agreement was 
inadvertent does not lessen its impact." In reversing the conviction 
Mr. Chief Justice Berger, writing for the majority, stated: 
This phase of the process of criminal justice and the 
adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of 
guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the 
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. 
Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor 
is that when a plea rests in any significant degree 
on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that 
it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. 404 
U.S. at 262. 
See also State of Utah v. Curtis Garfield No. 14384. Unlike 
Santobello supra the appellant was represented by a different counsel 
at the time his plea bargain was not kept than he had been represented 
by in negotiating the plea. At the time of entry of plea to the 
second charge the appellant mentioned the plea bargain (T. 102) but it 
was not until several months after his plea bargain had not been 
kept that the appellant mentioned the failure to his Salt Lake County 
defense counsel and was for the first time advised that he had a legal 
remedy. The appellant's counsel immediately filed a motion for Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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relief. The trial court denied the appellant's relief for the 
reason that the matter had not been called to the Court's attention 
at an earlier date (R.62). 
The effect of the holding of the Third District Court is to 
deny relief to the appellant for his having not been versed enough 
in the law to realize that he had relief coming. Such a result 
flies in the face of the most elementary legal reasoning and logic 
and our Supreme Court decisions of Miranda v. Arizona 344 U.S. 436, 
16 L. Ed 2d 694 (1966) and Boykin v. Alabama 395 U. S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 
2d 274 (1969) holding that a waiver of rights must be done knowingly 
and intelligently. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S CHANGE OF PLEA WAS BASED UPON THE ASSURANCES 
AND PROMISES OF THE COURT AND WAS, THEREFORE, NOT 
VOLUNTARY. 
At the time that the appellant withdrew his not guilty plea and 
entered a plea of guilty, the court stated to him, "I understand from 
what Mr. Kunkler says that the Box Elder County attorney has indicated 
that upon your plea of guilty down here, he would dismiss charges 
pending against you up there, and do you understand that that will 
be done." (R.58) emphasis added. In Walters v. Harris, 460 F. 2d 
988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973) a petitioner 
claimed that he was induced into pleading guilty by the prosecutor's 
unkept promise in regard to sentencing. The court granted relief 
stating: 
-5-
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i 
If Walters was in fact promised by the Assistant United States 
Attorney that he would recieve a ten-year sentence, he is 
entitled to relief. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 
(4th Cir. 1972). Sentencing Walters was within the authority 
of no one but the trial judge. An assurance by another that 
Walters would receive a particular sentence, therefore, 
would be a promise that could not be kept. An unkept bargain 
which has induced a guilty plea is grounds for relief. 
Santobello v. New York, 404, U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 
2d 42? (1971). 460 F.2d at 991-92. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court held likewise in State v. Ortiz, 
77 N. M. 751, 427 P.2d 264 (1967) stating at 266 "It is a fundamental 
rule of criminal procedure that a judgment and sentence cannot stand 
if based upon an involuntary plea of guilty induced by an unkept 
promise of leniency.11 See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 
487, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1962) Roberts v. People 404 P.2d 
and State v. Morgan 307 P.2d 244, 131 Mont. 58 (1957). 
In all the above cases the promises made to the defendants were 
made by the prosecuting attorneys and in only Ortiz supra was the 
court even aware that a promise had been made. In appellants case 
the need for relief is far more compelling than any of the above 
because not only was the unkept promise made by the prosecutor but it 
was also made by the Court itself (R.58). 
CONCLUSION 
Where the appellant has plead guilty to a charge as the 
result of a plea bargain in which he was promised by both the 
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prosecutor and the Judge who excepted his plea that an additional 
charge against him would be dismissed and that charge was not 
dismissed then the appellant must be allowed to withdraw his plea 
and go to trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK W. KUNKLER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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